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BELGIAN HISTORY AND THE NEUTRALITY
QUESTION.
BY THE EDITOR.
BELGIUM, in industry and art, is for its size one of the greatest
countries in the world, and it is the Flemish portion of the
population that has been and still is leading in these noble pursuits.
Historians of the country point with pride to the old Flemish
school patronized by the wealthy burghers, and from the long list
of great artists we will mention the following names : the brothers
Hubert and Jan van Eyck, Hans Memling, and Quentin Matsys, all
of whom lived before the Reformation, the last one being a con-
temporary of Luther ; and Peter Paul Rubens, Anthony van Dyck
and David Teniers, the stars of Flemish art after the Reformation
;
but the greatest among them is Peter Paul Rubens.
After Charlemagne the country was divided into a number of
feudal principalities among which Flanders was the most prominent,
so as to enable the counts of Flanders to acquire the territories of
their weaker neighbors. Before the time of the Reformation Hol-
land and Belgium developed together, as they formed practically
one country, known as the Netherlands. The line of the counts
of Flanders died out in 1384, the last one of them leaving a daughter
who was married to Charles the Bold of Burgundy. Times were
favorable ; commerce and trade developed ; and the dukes patronized
artists ; all of which resulted in the first golden age of Flemish art.
But in time new conditions arose ; Mary of Burgundy, the daugh-
ter of Charles the Bold, married Maximilian of Hapsburg, later on
Emperor, who in 1477 inherited the Netherlands ; and when Maxi-
milian's grandson, Emperor Charles V, retired into a monastery
in 1556, he divided his extended possessions into two parts. His
German lands (now the Austrian empire) fell to his brother, Ferdi-
nand I, who also became emperor, while Spain, with the Nether-
lands, was given to his son, Philip II of Spain, a Spaniard by edu-
cation and inclination. This distribution practically meant that the
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Netherlands became subject to Spain, and Philip's many encroach-
ments upon the independence of the citizens brought about the Dutch
revohition ; for he expected his Dutch subjects to obey him with
the same submission as he had become accustomed to in Spain.
The Netherlands had, for the most part, adopted the Reformation,
and Philip II proposed to force them back into submission to
Rome. The result was a protracted war in which the Spaniards
failed to subject the seven northern provinces of the Netherlands.
These concluded an alliance in 1579, fighting with perseverance and
FLEMISH PEASANTS.
By David Teniers.
courage against their oppressors; and in 1581 they declared their
independence from Spain under William of Orange who, in 1584,
fell a victim to the dagger of an assassin. His last thoughts were
with the people to whom he had devoted his life, and a well-known
portrait of him preserved in The Hague has inscribed over it his last
words
:
"Mon Dieu, ayes pitie de mon ame,
Mon Dieu, ayes pitie de ce pauvre peuple !"
William's son, Maurice, although only seventeen years of age,
continued the work of his father with energy and ability, and the
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seven provinces, now called the kingdom of Holland, maintained
their independence.
The two men, William of Orange and Philip II of Spain, repre-
geb.1533 - ^e;im^l 15$^,
WILLIAM OF ORANGE.
sent the division which took place between Holland and Belgium.
Though the countries were reunited again in 1814, the two peoples
had become so alienated from each other that they could not be truly
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formed into one pation. Belgium remained influenced by France,
and its population was either severely Roman Catholic, or, as is
quite common in purely Catholic countries, became positively ir-
religious. A middle party of moderate views scarcely existed. At
the same time French manners, French amusements and French
luxury have become the standard of life, and Brussels prides itself
in being a second Paris.
When the Hapsburg line of Spain died out a European war
ensued, known as the War of the Spanish Succession, and at the
end of it Belgium, then called the Spanish Netherlands, fell again
to Austria according to the conditions of the peace of Utrecht ; and
with the exception of several years of French conquest (1745-1748),
it remained Austrian until the French Revolution involved Bel-
gium and resulted in its incorporation, in 1794, into the French
republic. It remained French under Napoleon, but after Napoleon's
fall in 1815, it again became a part of the Netherlands under King
William I of the Orange family, a lineal descendant of William,
the first stadtholder.
But, as stated above, the two countries, Belgium and Holland,
had become estranged, and it was difficult for the two portions of the
population to live together in peace. The discontent in Belgium re-
sulted finally, in 1830, in a rebellion which, supported by France and
England, led to a separation and the establishment of a new con-
stitutional monarchy, called Belgium. Luxemburg, however, was
excluded and remained an independent duchy, connected with the
kingdom of Holland in personal union, and a part of the German
confederacy.
A national congress elected first a French prince, the Duke of
Nemours, but his father. King Louis Philippe of France, declined
the offer on his son's behalf, and England recommended the uncle
of the Prince Consort—his father's younger brother—Prince Leo-
pold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who accepted the candidacy and was
elected June 4, 1831, with 152 out of 196 votes.
King Leopold I married Princess Louise of Orleans, the daugh-
ter of Louis Philippe, and governed his new kingdom with wisdom
and success. His son, Leopold H, followed him after his death,
in 1865, and, Leopold H dying without a legitimate heir to the
throne, his brother's son, Albert, succeeded him.
One condition of the establishment of Belgium, made by
England, was the declaration of her neutrality, which was guaran-
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teed by Prussia, Austria, France and England. This neutrality
meant that in case of war Belgian territory should not be tres-
passed, and thus should serve as a home of peace from which
European quarrels should be kept away.
This idea is perhaps based on the English notion that any
European war should be kept away from the country which lies
opposite to England ; but the idea is a mere pious wish which was
recognized even at the time it was proposed to be an illusion, quite
desirable but impossible and unrealizable. Belgium has a very
central position in Europe, and it is no accident that a great num-
ber of European battles have been fought on its soil, the best known
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of which is Waterloo. Was it possible in these cases for the bel-
ligerents to keep out? Scarcely. The idea of Belgian neutrality
was an experiment and we now know that it failed.
We pity Belgium for the sad fate which has befallen it, but
we must consider that its central position is not only a source of
danger in times of war, but an enormous advantage in times of
peace. Belgium's unrivaled prosperity is due to it. Similarly,
those who cultivate the fields and the slopes of Mount Vesuvius and
Mount Aetna enjoy rich harvests, but must from time to time ex-
pect volcanic eruptions.
It is difficult to understand the purport of England's proposal
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to make Belgium an especially neutral country with some unde-
finable sanctity. Is it not true that, under normal conditions, every
country is neutral, and that, if other countries are at war, the neu-
trality of its citizens, its ships, its possessions and all that apper-
tains to it should be respected. The special and extraordinary sanc-
tity of Belgium's neutrality has never been defined. Would England
have allowed Belgian ships free passage, while those of Holland
and Denmark were inspected for contraband and dragged into
British harbors? Scarcely! What, then, is the real difference
between the neutrality of Belgium and that of other countries?
This question would be difficult to answer if we did not know what
kind of policy England has in mind. We have only to remember
the explanation of the late Earl Roberts who insisted that the coast
and territory opposite England must not fall into the hands of a
strong power.
Belgium is a territory which, according to old tradition, Eng-
land wishes to have perpetually kept in weak hands, and so England
is greatly interested in seeing Belgium made inviolable. This can
only mean that England wants to prevent Belgium's annexation by
a strong power, be it France or Germany.
When the idea was originally concocted in the brain of an
English diplomat the danger of annexation lay not in Austria or
Prussia, least of all in Germany, but in France. In fact England
did not even deem it necessary to make Germany (then the Ger-
man confederacy) an accessory to the treaty and. as stated above,
had it ratified by the two great German states, Prussia and Austria.
If the German Emperor had been a quibbler on points of legality
he would have ordered Bavarian, Swabian, Hessian or Hanoverian
troops to force the passage through Belgium, and all the virulent
accusation of England would have lost its force ; Prussia had signed
the treaty, but not Germany, and the truth is that every declaration
of war is a breach of neutrality, and the neutrality of a country
which is practically a vassal state of England is, for that reason,
not more sacred than that of any other country.
The Franco-German frontier is comparatively short, and on
both sides excellently protected. The French knew very well that
both Metz and Strasburg were formidable fortresses, very difficult
to take, and that, even if they were taken, the possession of Alsace-
Lorraine would open the way not to Berlin but only into Southern
Germany. Therefore the French naturally deemed it desirable to
break through Belgium into Germany. For diplomatic reasons
they would, of course, prefer the Germans to be guilty of the
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breach of neutrality, but if the Germans had not done it they would
have done it themselves, because, for strategical reasons, they
deemed the widening of the theater of war and the possession of
the direct route from Paris to Berlin indispensable for their success.
If the Germans had been assured that Belgium's neutrality
would have been respected by the other powers they would have
had the great advantage of having to protect only their short and
well-defended frontier. They would have been able to concentrate
the force of their army against Russia and keep on the defensive
in Alsace-Lorraine. The neutrality of Belgium, provided it had
been assured, would actually have been of great advantage to
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Germany. Why then did she not keep it, but instead break it
deliberately and ruthlessly?
The answer and explanation is this. The neutrality of Belgium
was not assured- The Germans claim to have reliable information
that the French had planned to invade Germany through Belgium.
I need not here repeat the well-known statement that French officers
were in Belgium before the beginning of the war; and there were
numerous indications that the French intended to surprise the
Germans after the war had started, by an outflanking movement
whereby they would be atacked in the rear. This would have been
fatal, and any one who knows something about war knows that
the mere possibility (and in this case it was a great probability,
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amounting to a practical certainty) could not be overlooked or ig-
nored, or left till a time when the emergency would present itself
as an accomplished fact, Ijut has to be counted upon and prevented
before it can materialize.
That interesting novel, La fin dc Icnipirc allciiiandc, by Major
de Civrieux (reviewed in the March number of TJic Open Court,
p. 190) sets very plainly before our minds French ideas on this
subject. It is a very cheap attitude, that of accusing the Germans
on moral grounds for the breach of Belgian neutrality ; but if they
had allowed themselves to be duped, and if the theater of war had,
by a French outflanking movement through Belgium, with or with-
out Belgian consent, placed the French army into the Rhinelands,
the allies would simply have laughed at German carelessness.
If the English were at all desirous of attacking Germany they
had still stronger reasons for selecting Belgium as a basis for an
attack of Germany, for the German frontier in the region of Metz
and Aliihlhausen is too far away from their base of supplies, and
the obstacles oft'ered by the A'osges mountains are too formidable.
The Germans did not want to attack England- They were en-
joying a peaceful prosperity. Their industries were expanding
in an unprecedented manner. But General Bernhardi warned the
Germans of the English danger, exhorting them to be prepared
for war and prophesying that war must come simply because their
natural growth led them to encroach upon British interests. The
German prophet of the war did not preach war, nor did he incite
to war ; he raised a warning voice, pointed out a great danger, and
exhorted Germany to be prepared for it.
If the Germans had intended to attack England they would have
accepted the French and Russian proposition to join with them in
a general protest against England on account of the Boer war.
Kaiser Wilhelm sympathized with the Boers, but he did not go so
far as to assume a hostile attitude toward the English or start a
war in behalf of his South African friends. Bernhardi would per-
haps have accepted the proposition of the French and the Russians,
but his views were not approved and he was a voice crying in the
wilderness. His book was almost unnoticed in Germany.
In the crisis of 1914 Germany would gladly have been satisfied
to let Belgium enjoy her privilege of neutrality if she could only
have been assured that her enemies themselves would respect it ; but
all military arrangements pointed the other way and convinced the
German General Staff that they had to expect a French or even a
Franco-Belgian invasion. If Belgium really meant to be neutral
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there was no need of a large Belgian army. But it is well known
that Belgium's army was of unusual strength for the size of the
country, more than three times greater numerically than the entire
English army, and it has, in consequence, played quite a considerable
part in the present war.
The Belgian policy did not adhere to a neutral course, and we
do not blame the Belgian kings for it, for the role of neutrality
imposed upon the country by English interests was too difficult and
too delicate to be carried out. The acquisition of the Congo state
was its first great infringement, and in more recent times King
Albert attempted a confederacy among the five small northern
BRABANT LACE OF THE YEAR 1596.
powers (Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) which
clearly implied a violation of Belgian neutrality. England knew
that the old treaty of 1839 had lost its significance. Gladstone
acknowledged this openly, and made a new treaty during the war
of 1870-71, to last for a year, to guard Belgian neutrality. But even
this was of doubtful value, for necessity knows no restriction, and
when Napoleon III saw his cause on French territory lost he tried
to break through Belgium and would have ventured an attack on
the Rhenish provinces had the German army not cut off the French
army at Sedan, close to the Belgian frontier, and compelled the
entire French force to surrender.
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The documents of a secret understanding between England and
Belgium, involving also France, are a sufficient proof that neither
England nor Belgium thought seriously of the neutrality treaty of
1839, and this remains true in spite of the declaration by Sir Ed-
ward Grey and the Belgian government that the Brussels documents
were of a purely informal character. It is unfortunate for England
that they fell into German hands ; the cleverest excuses and explana-
tions will not annihilate their existence nor minimize their signifi-
cance. Whether we call this kind of "conversation" informal, or
Platonic, or even pacifistic, the Germans cannot be blamed for re-
garding them as positive proof of a conspiracy between England,
Belgium and France, against Germany.
The German General Stafif did not yet know of the Brussels
documents ; there were other reasons why an attack through Bel-
gium was considered necessary. It is noticeable that the Belgian
fortifications face Germany, not France. On the German frontier
of Belgium there were two fortified Belgian camps, one on either
side of the fortress Iluy ; none lie on the French frontier, which
suggests that the French were regarded as allies. The fortified
camps are enclosed by a belt of forts, and they are a continuation
of the French forts along the river Meuse, erected against Germany
on the Franco-German frontier. The three great fortresses, Ant-
werp, Liege and Namur, were kept up to date without regard to
cost, and French officers were consulted as to the best methods of
installing modern improvements.
Under these circumstances the German Chancellor had a per-
fect right to regard the old treaty of Belgian neutrality, over eighty
years old, as "a scrap of paper." It was concluded under decidedly
different conditions, before Belgium had developed into a military,
and indeed a belligerent state, unfriendly, yes obviously hostile, to
Germany. It must be a very partial judgment that would not at
least give Germany the benefit of the doubt, and the Brussels docu-
ments discovered later on, together with the evidence furnished by
the letters of the Belgian ministers, justify the German procedure.
Sir Edward Grey explains that the Brussels documents refer
to a very harmless conversation "discussing the help which England
should send Belgium only in case of a hreacli of Belgian neutrality
by other powers." Would Sir Edward also have protected Belgium
against France? If so, is it not strange that French ports had
been selected for the landing of English troops?—a fact which
proves that France was implicated. A previous plan had been to
land troops in Antwerp, but this was abandoned because of the
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erection, by the Dutch, of fortifications at the mouth of the Schelde
;
and it now became clear why the proposition of the Dutch to fortify
the Schelde river, commanding the entrance to Antwerp from the
sea, called forth so much violent opposition in London and Paris.
If the English policy was so pacific, as stated by Sir Edward,
it is strange that these harmless "conversations" were treated with
such confidential secrecy. It would have been better to make such
pacific discussions public, because they might then have had an
influence on the Germans and taught them to keep hands off.
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Moreover, they ought to have been made not only with the French
against the Germans, but also with the Germans against the French.
If it is true (as says Sir Edward) that "there is no note of
these conversations at the British War Office or Foreign Office,"
does he mean to say that the reports of these conversations were
kept in another place, or that "these conversations" were purely
private and were neither authorized by, nor at all reported to, the
British government? If they were indeed so rigorously conditional
on a German invasion why was the condition not emphasized at the
start in plain and unmistakable words, but only incidentally men-
tioned? And I feel inclined to add : if they only served to encourage
the Belgians to resist, why were they not lived up to by Great
Britain? The Germans did not want this war and are perfectly
well convinced that their Kaiser strove for peace up to the last
minutje.
The art of English diplomacy consisted in uniting all the ele-
ments hostile to Germany and making them act simultaneously.
The plan was to deal the enemy a sudden and crushing blow by an
overwhelming array of hostile forces which would invade Germany
at once on two sides, the east and the west ; and we must grant, the
idea was very clever. The French and the Russians would have
done the work, and as usual the English would have reaped the
benefit.
Germany broke Belgian neutrality because she knew that the
French intended to attack the poorly-protected Rhenish province,
and this is the reason which the German Chancellor gave officially.
He regretted the necessity for the deed, he granted that it was wrong
and proclaimed that for the damage caused by the German army
Germany would reimburse the sufferers. Moreover, he guaran-
teed Belgian independence—and all this provided Belgium would
allow the Germans to pass through Belgium. Belgium rejected the
offer and joined the Triple Entente.
Sir Edward Grey, in commenting on the situation, not un-
appropriately quotes the parody on a Shakespeare passage thus
:
"'Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just',
But four times he that gets his blow in fust."
Sir Edward is right ; the quotation from King Henry IV/ as
^ Part II, Act iii, Scene 2.
well as the sarcastic gloss added to it, is right, and it is an old
Prussian principle to act on it. Prussian strategists believe that
there is only one method of defense which can be successful, that
THE MARRIAGE OF ST. CATHARINE.
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is, a vigorous offensive. This course alone promises victory. It
was natural that the Kaiser should hesitate to begin a war ; but it
was equally to be expected that, as soon as he knew that war was
unavoidable, he would take the offensive, in order to get "his blow
in fust," even though this course exposed him to the criticism of
having begun the war. The pro-British press has made good use
of this point, and has on the strength of it converted many to regard
Germany as the disturber of the peace.
I have given. careful consideration to the English presentation
of the question and have come to the conclusion that, as usual, it
shows much more keenness and diplomatic wisdom than the Ger-
man, and thus has a strong appearance of justice; but the cause of
Germany, though often presented in a misleading way, is truly just.
The war, and also the breach of Belgian neutrality, were forced
upon Germany. Therefore, according to Sir Edward Grey's quo-
tation, the Germans are seven times armed ; three times because
their quarrel is just, and four times because, as soon as they saw
that war was positively unavoidable, they did not wait for the allies
to invade Germany, but dealt the first blow.
I believe in the Germans and in the German cause, but for that
reason I am not anti-English, or anti-British. I am fully convinced
that the English people did not begin this war ; but I do believe that
the British diplomats have carefully prepared it and have gradually
made the English believe that the war was necessary. The first
step toward the war was the formation of the Triple Entente, and
the Triple Entente with all that it implies was not only vicious, but
also an asinine stupidity. I will not here dwell on the viciousness
of this compact, for diplomats believe that in statecraft no moral
law is binding, and English diplomats have acted accordingly. The
policy of British diplomacy has of course been kept secret, for part
of the diplomatic art consists in the hypocrisy of pretending to be
truthful and moral, at the same time making the enemy seem a liar
even when he is simply suffering (as are the Germans) from an
undiplomatic frankness or "brazen candor."
I will lose no space here in pointing out the moral deficiencies
of the English policy. These are apparent in all her recent wars,
not one of which has been righteous. And, in the present war,
I insist that the scheme of crushing Germany is insensate beyond
measure.
First, neither the Russians nor the French are or, in spite of
their present alliance, can become true friends of the English ; on
the contrary both dislike, or even hate, the English even at the
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present time most intensely. The English propose to use their
allies for the sake of helping them to crush the Germans, but as
soon as the task is done the old enmities will be renewed.
Secondly, the English underrate German strength, intelligence
and ability in both the defensive and the offensive ; they have not
the slightest idea of what their cousins on the continent will endure
in patience and sacrifice. The Germans are a more formidable foe
than the English have ever before encountered, and they should
have thought twice before entering this war—the very first war in
history between England and Germany.
Thirdly, the English have overrated their allies and also them-
selves. The chances for an easy victory looked splendid ; indeed
victory seemed perfectly assured. The French army was in better
condition than ever, even under the first Napoleon ; the Russians
are so numerous ; and the two ought to have been sufficient to crush
the Germans. But it takes more than an overwhelming majority to
beat the Germans ; it takes leadership as well, and that is missing
in both France and Russia. The English think they can supply it,
and they boast of their former historical victories. The English
people do not even now know that the victories of Marlborough
were gained by Prince Eugene ; Marlborough simply happened to
be present ; and the battle of Waterloo was almost lost by Welling-
ton when the genius of Gneisenau saved the day by means of
Bliicher's Prussian army. The English have a very good opinion
of themselves, and it would have been better for them if they had
not overrated their own ability l^efore they had brought on the crisis.
The Germans are by no means the only people in the world
who represent culture, science, and the progress of humanity. There
are other civilized and partly civilized nations. The French and
the English range as high in literature and general culture as the
Germans, but one thing is sure, the Germans are leading in almost
every science and branch of cultural aspirations, not only in music
and other arts but also in chemistry and manufacture of all kinds.
Even if the Germans were defeated in war the cultural qualities of
Germany would make her indispensable for the progress of man-
kind, and it is this quality which adds to her warlike strength in
this critical moment when England seems to hold the key to the
situation on account of both her wealth and her naval supremacy.
We quote the following lines on German inventiveness from
Bulletin No. 10 of the "Kriegs-Ausschuss der deutschen Industrie
Berlin" :
"England has planned on the largest scale possible to starve
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out Germany. She is endeavoring to cut off all food supplies from
the inhabitants of Germany—men, women and children—and to
bring the German industry forcibly to a standstill by preventing
the importation of raw materials. In this way she hopes to weaken
the German people by hunger and make it impossible for them to
manufacture munitions of war, so that
they will finally be compelled to accept
a peace dictated by England.
"The English plan is based upon
the fact that before the war Germany
purchased a portion of its food supply
and raw materials abroad. . . .Through
its intimate cooperation with science
German Industrie has been particularly
successful in the past in discovering
new uses for apparently worthless raw
materials ;. and the public life of Ger-
man)^ has always been distinguished for
a model organization recognized even
by our enemies.
"During the present war England
has cut ofif Germany from the supply
of natural saltpetre in order to prevent
the manufacture of explosives and
make it impossible to fertilize the fields.
In the course of the few months since
the beginning of the war the chemical
industry has succeeded in making suf-
ficient quantities of artificial nitrates
from air and coal. The necessary fac-
tories have been built, and Germany is
now assured of an adequate supply of
saltpetre. Indeed, it may be said even
now, that after the end of the war
these new plants will continue to op-
ST. CATHARINE. erate and thus diminish to no small ex-
By Jan Van Eyck. tg^^ ^he importation of natural saltpetre,
so that England's starvation policy will bring permanent injury
only to the producers of natural saltpetre. Similarly in the matter
of petroleum. Since the importation of petroleum has been made
impossible, the great majority have now taken to the use of gas
and electricity. The new gas and electric fittings will of course
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continue to be used after the conclusion of the war, and we can
safely assume that in future Germany will import very much less
petroleum than formerly."
We will add that Dr. Hans Friedlander has recently improved
the chemical process of changing straw into food, and England's
proposition to reduce Germany by starvation seems thereby to have
received an additional check, one which would prove sufficient even
if the enormous agricultural improvements did not work.
A glaring instance of the difference between German effi-
ciency and English lack of progressiveness appears in naval war-
fare- The superiority of the English navy consists in numbers,
but in naval training, in good marksmanship and in grit the Ger-
mans are fully their equal. It is certain that the German crews
handle their submarines better than the English marines their
dreadnoughts. ; , ; i
The chances of crushing Germany seemed excellent, but the
Germans are up to the mark and it looks as if this time the English
have undertaken too much.
There are still other reasons why this war is an incredible
stupidity ; and we must bear in mind English bulldoggedness which
will carry on the war to the bitter end, even when conditions become
more and more unfavorable.
The war can bring no good to England. It can do her only
harm. It jeopardizes all the many advantageous positions England
has gained, the Suez canal. South Africa, Egypt, India. It may
also liberate Ireland. The war has allied her with Japan, a doubtful
and even dangerous confederate which will demand a high price
for its services
—
presumably nothing less than the recognition of
an Asiatic Monroe doctrine, Asia for the Asiatics. This means
at present, China for the Japanese and the Pacific for Asia ; in the
future it may mean more.
There is no need of going into further details, but it seems to
me it is not even in the interest of England that the cause of the
Allies should come out victorious. The English are fighting for a
cause which is most injurious to England herself.
It is true and I grant that England was in a precarious state,
due to what the English call the "German peril," and this seems to
me to be the only justification for her going to war. We have been
told that German aggressiveness could not be tolerated, and that
Germany must be crushed before she becomes too strong, and be-
fore she can endanger England's dominion over the seas. This is
the real reason for the war. All other reasons are mere pretexts;
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they are opportunities seized by smart diplomats for the purpose of
making Germany seem the responsible party.
It is true that Germany has been growing rapidly and even
threatened to eclipse England. But if English diplomacy had been
less smart and more wise it would have been possible to make of
the Germans friends and allies ; and how much better would they
have served the England of the future than the Japanese, or the
Russians, or even the French ! I have a great respect for English
diplomacy, but how much better had it been applied if it had
treated German rivalry as a friendly and helpful competition. Have
not German settlers proved a most valuable element in English
colonies in times past, and have not the Germans been distinguished
by their diligence and industry as well as by their faithfulness? All
the benefits which England might have derived from a continued
friendship with the German people now seem well-nigh impossible
of realization, and the hope of building up a firmly established world
peace upon the good entente of Germany, England and the United
States almost appears lost for all time.
Who is guilty of this crime? I repeat, it is the inventor of the
Triple Entente and the diplomats who have carried out the plan
underlying it ; and it is a sin that cannot be forgiven—neither in
the world of present conditions nor in the life to come. The curse
of it will live on into the distant future of mankind, and if the
English people but knew the inner workings of their politics they
would rise in indignation and give the men responsible for the
present situation their deserts. But I fear it is too late.
